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AB S TRACT. The contours of our federal system are under constant negotiation, as
governments construct the scope of one another's interests and powers while pursuing their
agendas. For our institutions to manage these dynamics productively, we must understand the
value the system is capable of generating. But no single conception of this value exists, because
the virtues and costs of any particular federal-state relationship, in any given federalism
controversy, will appear different depending on perspective: the federal, state, and even local will
each perceive their own advantages. And none of these conceptions will map perfectly onto the
people's perceptions. In this essay, I attempt to answer the question of what federalism might be
good for from each of these perspectives by considering how it has structured various regulatory
and social controversies in recent years on matters such as immigration, marriage equality, drug
policy, and health care reform. I focus on the administrative and enforcement judgments that
each of these debates has required, in order to illuminate the discretionary spaces in which much
of the work of federalism occurs. I argue that the value of the system common to all participants
and that should govern the negotiation of inter-governmental relations is its creation of a
framework for ongoing negotiation of differences large and small. In the spirit of this Feature, I
emphasize that having many institutions with lawmaking power enables overlapping political
communities to work toward national integration, while preserving governing spaces for
meaningful disagreement when consensus fractures or proves elusive.
AUTHOR. Professor of Law, Yale Law School. In developing this essay, I benefitted
enormously from conversations with Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Heather Gerken, Abbe Gluck,
Alison LaCroix, and Judith Resnik. I also am very grateful for the excellent research assistance of
Trinity Brown, Alex Hemmer, and Samuel Kleiner.
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INTRODUCTION
The question of what value federalism generates has no single answer, nor
does its corollary of how the system ought to be structured to maximize its
virtues. The value generated by decentralized decision-making will appear
different depending on the perspective adopted when considering the matter,
as will the ideal design of inter-governmental relations. If we step inside the
system itself and adopt an institutionalist point of view, the answers will reflect
the interests of the system's actors and take on partisan and bureaucratic
characteristics. If we try to answer the questions externally, either from a
popular or scholarly vantage point, the answers will become more ideological
and normative. The question of federalism's value breaks down into several
inquiries: Of what value is it to the central government to have state and local
governments to contend with? Of what value is it to state and local
governments to be embedded in a system with a strong central government
and myriad competing governments? Of what value is it to the people to have
government power split and decentralized?
A reader reasonably could conclude that the first two questions may matter
to a descriptive account of our federalism, but only the third perspective-the
popular one -truly matters when debating the merits of the system. But the
institutional perspectives convey important information about how the system
functions, which in turn helps reveal the possibilities for governance the
system creates. In this essay, I adopt each of the three perspectives outlined
above in order to develop a complete sense of these possibilities. In so doing, I
give content to one of the central insights of the work highlighted in this
Feature-that federalism does not consist of a fixed set of relationships.
Instead, its parameters are subject to ongoing negotiation by the players in the
system, according to the advantages each might accrue from a particular set of
relations.' Understanding the substance of these negotiations should ultimately
lay the groundwork for a normative account of inter-governmental relations.
1. In describing federalism as consisting of constant negotiation, my thinking aligns with
recent scholarship showing that the relationships among institutions are not fixed but rather
evolve as necessity demands. As other scholars increasingly have begun to explore in varied
regulatory settings, the levels of government set each other's agendas and help constitute
each other's abilities to act through constraints that are as much political as legal. See ERIN
RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN (2012); Abbe R. Gluck, Federalism from
Federal Statutes: Health Reform, Medicaid, and the Old-Fashioned Federalists' Gamble, 81
FORDHAM L. REv. 1749 (2013); Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory
Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J.
534 (2011) [hereinafter Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism]; Judith Resnik, Federalism(s)'s Forms
and Norms: Contesting Rights, De-Essentializing Jurisdictional Divides, and Temporizing
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None of the actors I name is unitary, of course, which makes defining any
of their perspectives on a given federalism controversy, not to mention the
system itself, tricky. The federal government consists of political and
bureaucratic actors arrayed into different branches and representative of
different political parties. The sub-federal consists of myriad state and local
governments with varying degrees of autonomy from one another and from
the center. And the "popular" perspective may be the most variegated and
amorphous; it consists of a large and diverse assortment of interests woven
together by economic, social, and cultural affiliations and through interest
groups and networks such as political parties.
And yet, if we consider each of these actors in relation to one another, a
distinct perspective on federalism's value can be attributed to each. For the
federal government, the virtues of the system include having states and
localities to enlist in the expansion of its capacities, as well as having other
governments to take the lead in various regulatory domains, for political and
practical reasons. At the same time, pulling in the opposite direction will be the
federal government's interest in maintaining control (though not necessarily
dominance) over the domains to which its powers extend. The federal interest
can thus be served by managed diversity, rather than uniformity. State and
local officials and entities will certainly have an interest in collaborating with
the federal government and taking advantage of federal largesse, whether to
advance their own or their parties' political ambitions, or to help resolve the
governance problems they face. But the decisional independence the federalist
system affords will often be of political and policy value, too, and will be worth
fighting to preserve, even when it places them at odds with the potential
federal benefactor. From the popular point of view, federalism's value will be
harder to pinpoint, because the people themselves are not a bureaucratic
institution set up in relief to other institutions. Instead, they consist of a
sprawling agglomeration of diverse identities and interests. Whether the
federal or the sub-federal should address a particular matter may depend on
Accommodations, in FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY: NOMOS LV (James E. Fleming & Jacob
T. Levy, eds.) (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at i) (on file with author) (arguing that the
domains of authority within the federal system "are not fixed but renegotiated as conflicts
emerge about the import of rights and the content of jurisdictional allocations"). I and
others have taken to heart Rick Hills's observation that what matters most in understanding
federalism as a system is understanding how the levels of government work in tandem.
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National
Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 4 (2007) ("[T]heories of preemption need to accept
the truisms that the federal and state governments have largely overlapping jurisdictions,
that each level of government is acutely aware of what the other is doing, and that each level
regulates with an eye to how such regulation will affect the other.").
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how the form of regulation maps onto people's substantive preferences. In a
more high-minded sense, the virtues of the system for the people will stem
from the extent to which it advances the purposes of government.
Though pursuit of their interests by each player may often lead to conflict,
particularly over which institutions should control any given policy domain, I
argue that the value of the system common to all of its participants is the
framework it creates for the ongoing negotiation of disagreements large and
small - a value that requires regular attention by all participants to the integrity
of federalism's institutions. It is in this sense that I think federalism constitutes
a framework for national integration, in the spirit of this Feature. It creates a
multiplicity of institutions with lawmaking power through which to develop
national consensus, while establishing a system of government that allows for
meaningful expressions of disagreement when consensus fractures or proves
elusive - a value that transcends perspective.
In what follows, I attempt to establish these conclusions by considering
how the negotiations required by federalism have structured our national
debates over a number of pressing social welfare issues, including immigration,
marriage equality, drug policy, education and health care reform, and law
enforcement. I focus on how these debates play out in what I call the
discretionary spaces of federalism, which consist of the policy conversations
and bureaucratic negotiations that actors within the system must have to figure
out how to interact with one another both vertically and horizontally. Indeed,
within existing legal constraints, state and local actors will have considerable
room to maneuver, and the federal government considerable discretion to
refrain from taking preemptive action. I highlight questions of administration
and enforcement, because it is in these domains that the system's actors
2. As Alison LaCroix illuminates in her essay for this Feature, though we might think of court
doctrine as setting clear parameters for the political branches, judicial doctrine too is
negotiated-the product of shifts in federal power and partisan and ideological dynamics
that leave open "opportunities for creative litigation." I take what she describes as the
Court's turn to the "shadow powers" of Article I to be an effort to devise new approaches to
conceptualizing and sometimes constraining federal power in the wake of a Commerce
Clause jurisprudence that leaves the federal government with all the authority to regulate it
could want or need. See Alison L. LaCroix, The Shadow Powers ofArticle I, 123 YALE L.J. 2044,
2049 (2014) (arguing that "the battles of judicial federalism are fought not across the well-
trampled no-man's-land of the commerce power or the Tenth Amendment, but in the less
trafficked doctrinal redoubts of these 'shadow powers"'). These developments add yet
another variable into the federal-state negotiation, especially to the extent that the Court has
called into question the federal government's power to use the Spending Clause to provide
states incentives for participation in federal schemes with its decision in National Federation
of Independent Business (NFIB) v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). The consequences of the
shifts she describes for federal regulation are unfolding as we write.
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construct one another's powers and interests on an ongoing basis, based on the
value they seek to derive from the system. In these discretionary spaces,
"winners" must sometimes emerge from discrete conflicts, whether through
judicial resolution or political concession, and the parameters set by courts and
Congress obviously define the terrain of negotiation. But the inter-
governmental relationships and overlapping political communities the system
creates are neither locked in zero-sum competition nor bound by fixed rules of
engagement, precisely what makes federalism productive regardless of
perspective.
The question then becomes, what follows from this conception of
federalism, according to which the value generated by federalism varies
depending on who's speaking. The talk of negotiation and the corresponding
positionalist perspective on federalism work against the development of
totalizing theories about how best to allocate power. It becomes difficult to
move from describing the functions federalism performs in different domains
to an overarching normative structural theory. As Heather Gerken has argued,
many different federalisms exist.3 Even if we can identify a proper conception
of federalism as a matter of original understanding, or of Supreme Court
doctrine, that conception still will depend on the regulatory domain in
question -the Court's immigration federalism looks quite different from its
economic federalism. 4 More importantly, when we step into the discretionary
spaces I describe, the "look" of the system will depend on the particular choices
made by the players in question- choices that will depend on the advantages
both the federal and the local perceive from either asserting or declining to use
their power, which in turn will be motivated by political and partisan
commitments.s
3. Heather K. Gerken, Our Federaiism(s), 53 WM. &MARYL. REV. 1549, 1550 (2012).
4. Cf Adam B. Cox, Enforcement Redundancy and the Future of Immigration Law, 2012 SUP. CT.
REv. 31, 31-32 (noting that the Court's preemption analysis in Arizona v. United States, 132 S.
Ct. 2492 (2012), which rejects state enforcement redundancy, does not apply to other areas
of state regulation).
s. As Jessica Bulman-Pozen has persuasively argued, the federal system provides a kind of
scaffolding for partisan debate. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2014) [hereinafter Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism]. In her essay for
this Feature, she emphasizes the unity of state and federal interests and argues that the fault
lines between state and federal governments are no longer so great, because the levels of
government are united by politics and the demands of administration. See Jessica Bulman-
Pozen, From Sovereignty and Process to Administration and Politics: The Afterlife of American
Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1920, 1932-33 (2014) [hereinafter Bulman-Pozen, Afterlife]. This
observation certainly strikes me as correct in historical perspective, and an important
element of the negotiation I describe is identification by federal and state actors of points of
common cause and mutual advantage. As I explore throughout this essay, however,
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I ultimately believe we can still express proceduralist preferences for
decentralized decision-making, regardless of the perspective adopted, based on
observations about the value over time of such a structure. Elsewhere, I explore
how decentralization can help simultaneously shape political consensus and
channel ideological diversity.6 Here, I focus on the dynamics of negotiation in
order to understand better the possibilities federalism creates for the players in
the system. This conclusion does not preclude acknowledging that national
institutions should be strong and sometimes cut off decentralized debate in the
interest of protecting a national norm or the public good, or assert centralized
authority to overcome regulatory dysfunctions.7 But, again, it does point in
the direction of developing rules of engagement that keep federalism's
institutions robust.
This positionalist inquiry draws on my federalism-related work to date and
dovetails with the approaches to federalism highlighted by the contributors to
this Feature in at least two ways. First, in my work on immigration federalism,
my central preoccupation has been to figure out what purposes state and local
activity might serve in a traditionally federal domain, as well as to understand
why state and local officials have claimed authority to act-whether those
reasons differ from the concerns that motivate the federal government's
regulation.' I have been concerned less with the identification and delineation
of the scope of federal versus state power and more with understanding
immigration federalism as an example of how the overlapping political
communities in our body politic negotiate with one another to address matters
of national concern. 9 My efforts to understand the motivations behind and
significance of sub-federal activity has entailed challenging broad conceptual
institutional interests drive the federalism dynamic, too, and even when governments align
politically, those interests often lead to divergent conclusions about how power should be
wielded.
6. Cristina M. Rodriguez, Federalism and National Consensus (Oct. 2013) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
7. For a leading and powerful theory of the purposes of Article I, Section 8, see Robert D.
Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory ofArticle I, Section 8, 63
STAN. L. REv. 115 (2010), which rejects the economic/non-economic activity distinction
drawn by the Supreme Court on the ground that neither the federal nor state governments
are necessarily better at regulating one or the other, and proposes a theory of federal power
as directed at solving collective action problems generated by inter-state externalities and
national markets.
8. See Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 1o6 MICH.
L. REV. 567 (2008).
g. Of course, the fact that state and local power to regulate immigration might be limited
cannot be escaped-the Supreme Court's 2012 decision in Arizona underscores the
importance of sovereignty to the debate over immigration regulation.
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assumptions of federal exclusivity with an appreciation of how deeply
integrated the regulatory regime has become across levels of government, not
to mention how fractured and decentralized the political conversation has been.
Second, in this same work, I have sought to highlight how decentralized
ferment helps constitute our national debate on the subject of immigration. I
have de-centered the national from the federal to explore how "national"
issues - those whose salience cuts across state lines and constituencies - are not
always or necessarily best served by a federal monopoly,o and how state and
local debate and regulation can serve national interests. In more recent work on
federalism generally, I highlight these same dynamics of decentralized ferment
and inter-institutional negotiation in other contexts of highly charged social
policy - same-sex marriage, drug policy, and gun regulation - and argue that
among the most significant values of our federal system is its utility in
managing social conflict across policy domains." In line with the overarching
frame of this Feature, I show how decentralized decision-making can promote
national integration and national problem solving in a world of deep
demographic and ideological diversity. But I also emphasize that integration
does not depend on the achievement of a clear national consensus, though
decentralized debate can certainly result in the consolidation of national norms
or policies. Instead, integration can emerge through the achievement of an
equilibrium that contains within it the possibility of ongoing debate -a picture
of federalism I hope to illuminate here.
I. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND THE MIXED INTEREST IN
CONTROL
National debates can happen trans-locally with or without the federal
government in the lead. Under this view, the federal government becomes one
actor in the system. But because it has the authority to monopolize regulatory
domains and displace states, localities, and even private actors, its conceptions
of federalism will inform the character of the system more than any other
single government. Considering how the federal government might perceive
the value of federalism and therefore use its power-whether to consolidate its
own positions, tamp down decentralized ferment, create room for diversity in
io. As Alison LaCroix's work suggests, this conception of federal power differs from the original
design, according to which the Framers of the Constitution sought to create a union, with
its own particular general welfare, of which the federal government presumably would be
the custodian. See LaCroix, supra note 2, at 2089-90.
ii. See Rodriguez, supra note 6.
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regulation, or learn by observing how other actors address social problems -
becomes crucial to understanding federalism as a governing structure.
It might seem futile to attempt to identify a federal perspective on
federalism, given the complexity of the federal government." Congress and the
Executive Branch will often have divergent interests, particularly when
controlled by different parties. The myriad agencies of the federal government
itself will also interact with one another according to logics of cooperation, as
well as competition.13 The political layer of the bureaucracy may have different
priorities from the civil service.' 4 This multiplicity is part of what gives
federalism its negotiated character. As I explore in Part II, it creates
opportunities for state and local actors. But it also enables the federal
government to take advantage of federalism in numerous ways. And thus, even
if no single perspective can be attributed to the federal government, we can still
think in general terms about how a variegated center might approach the
governments contained within it.
The federal government (both Congress and the Executive Branch)
constructs its relationships with state and local actors in myriad ways: through
delegation; by incorporating state and local officials into federal bodies,
commissions, and regulatory regimes; or by crafting legislation or enforcement
policies to address tensions that might arise when state and local actors exercise
parallel but overlapping regulatory authority. Abbe Gluck has explored this
dynamic in the healthcare context, revealing the varied ways in which the
federal and state governments are intertwined through federal design." The
Immigration and Nationality Act also balances delegation to and constraint on
state authority and is full of different inter-governmental relationships
designed by Congress to both employ and shape the federal structure to suit its
policy objectives.'" In each sort of relationship, the Executive Branch must
regularly assess how to calibrate its involvement and assertions of authority."
12. For a perspective on how the variety of interests within the federal government intersects
with federalism dynamics, see Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the
Separation of Powers, 112 COLUM. L. REv. 259 (2011), which argues that states that disagree
with positions taken by the Executive Branch attempt to position themselves as faithful
agents of Congress, thus splitting open the federal government.
13. See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1131 (2012) (assessing the tools agencies use to resolve coordination
challenges and arguing that the challenge calls for strong presidential leadership).
14. For discussion of one such example, see infra notes 27-33, 41 and accompanying text.
15. See Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism, supra note 1.
16. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1) (2012) (authorizing the Secretary to "enter into a written
agreement with a State, or any political subdivision of a State, pursuant to which an officer
or employee of the State or subdivision . .. may carry out" the functions of investigating,
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Numerous factors will inform the federal government's choices about how
to interact with sub-federal legal and political institutions and bureaucracies.
The existence of the latter can expand the federal government's capacity to
govern and enforce the law." The federalist structure also can amplify the
influence of political parties and national politicians. Turning to its institutions
apprehending, or detaining "aliens in the United States"); id. § 1357(g)(io) ("Nothing in
this subsection shall be construed to require an agreement under this subsection in order for
any officer or employee ... to communicate with the [Secretary] regarding the immigration
status of any individual . . . or . . . otherwise to cooperate with [the Secretary] . . . ."); id.
§ 1622(a)-(b) (detailing state authority to limit eligibility of "qualified aliens" for state
public benefits); id. § 1373(b) (prohibiting state and local governments from preventing
their employees from exchanging immigration information with "any other Federal, State,
or local government entity"). The comprehensive immigration reform bill passed by the
Senate in 2013 would involve state officials in immigration policy in still new ways. For
instance, section 4 of the bill would create a Border Security Commission that would include
all border-state governors and the governor of Nevada. Together with presidential and
congressional appointees, the Commission would recommend a border security strategy
should the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) not be able to certify that the border
has been "secured" by a certain date. See Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and
Immigration Modernization Act of 2013, S. 744, 113th Cong. § 4 (2013). In a similar vein, the
FBI oversees myriad law enforcement task forces that rely on state and local police to assist
in intelligence gathering, investigation, and other crime-fighting operations. For exploration
of some of the legal issues surrounding joint law enforcement operations, see Authority of
FBI Agents, Serving as Special Deputy US Marshals, to Pursue Non-Federal Fugitives, 19
Op. O.L.C. 33 (1995). Matthew Waxman describes FBI counter-terrorism task forces in
which local law enforcement essentially "work on behalf of the federal government." See
Matthew C. Waxman, National Security Federalism, 64 STAN. L. REV. 298, 308 (2011).
17. For an example of this process, see infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text, discussing
enforcement priorities with respect to marijuana prosecutions. Along similar lines, during
the litigation over Arizona's Senate Bill 1070, DHS issued a memorandum detailing the
cooperation it sought from state and local police in immigration enforcement and defining
state and local action that amounted to non-cooperation. See Guidance on State and Local
Governments' Assistance in Immigration Enforcement and Related Matters, U.S. DEP'T
HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/guidance-state-local-assistance
-immigration-enforcement.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2014) [hereinafter Guidance on State and
Local Governments' Assistance] ("In light of laws passed by several states addressing the
involvement by state and local law enforcement officers in federal enforcement of
immigration laws, DHS concluded that this guidance would be appropriate to set forth
DHS's position on the proper role of state and local officers in this context.").
is. States' and localities' utility as force multipliers has been invoked to justify the enlistment of
state and local police in immigration enforcement. See, e.g., Kris W. Kobach, The
Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of Local Police to Make Immigration
Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REv. 179 (2005). In her recent work, Gillian Metzger has highlighted how
the Obama Administration has taken advantage of federalism to enhance the capacity to
regulate. See Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism Under Obama, 53 WM. & MARY L. REv. 567 (2011)
(detailing regulatory and financial opportunities for states and the move toward more active
government at the federal and state levels).
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can help federal actors advance their substantive agendas through lawmaking,
either by locating a substitute for it at the state or local level, or by laying
groundwork for future federal action. 9 The federal system also enables federal
actors to shift the burden of regulation and accountability for the handling of
difficult issues to other officials and politicians.2 o Each of these interests will
likely be at work in the federal government's "use" of the federal system.
But because the Constitution makes federal law supreme, working against
these incentives to utilize the federal structure will be a strong impulse to
maintain control over the domains to which federal power extends. When
interacting with the federal system, particularly when attempting to use it to its
advantage, the federal government frequently will face the questions of
whether and how to assert its supremacy, particularly when dealing with
questions of enforcement and administration. In the end, such control will be
elusive and may even be counterproductive, as it is in tension with some of the
strategies discussed above, but the desire to assert it will be an ever-present
part of the federal government's negotiation of the federalism dynamic.
The federal government's decision to file a lawsuit challenging Arizona's
Senate Bill 1070, which contained various provisions designed to crack down
on illegal immigration, reflects a particularly robust effort to assert control over
a decentralized debate. Despite a longstanding practice of significant state and
local involvement in various aspects of immigration enforcement, the federal
government sought to assert its primacy within that system through
litigation.2 ' From the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)'s law-
enforcement point of view, the Arizona law abandoned cooperation with the
federal government in favor of disruptive confrontation over how stringently to
enforce the law.2 2 For the Civil Rights Division, and perhaps even the Attorney
ig. See generally Bulman-Pozen, Afterlife, supra note 5.
2o. Among the well-documented reasons that Congress delegates authority to the Executive
Branch is to shift accountability to administrative actors for making controversial policy
decisions or difficult technical choices. See, e.g., DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O'HALLORAN,
DELEGATING POwERS: A TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER
SEPARATED POWERS (1999). It seems intuitive that a similar dynamic would motivate
delegations to states and localities.
21. I explore this decision-making process in detail elsewhere. See Rodriguez, supra note 6
(manuscript at 12-18).
22. Whether Arizona's S.B. 1070 and similar laws present meaningfil challenges to the federal
government's actual ability to manage its system of immigration arrests and removals
remains difficult to gauge. But in its filings in the case, the federal government repeatedly
emphasized that "S.B. 1070 cannot be sustained as an exercise in cooperative federalism
when its very design discards cooperation and embraces confrontation." Brief for the United
States on Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 22, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492
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General, S.B. 1070 may have become emblematic of the risk of racial profiling23
inherent in police enforcement of immigration laws, thus requiring a federal
response. Perhaps most important, Arizona's challenge to the federal
enforcement agenda, particularly when juxtaposed with the numerous other
states that followed suit, threatened federal leadership of the immigration
debate by offering a vision of immigration policy that relied on attrition
through enforcement, directly challenging President Obama's preferred
legalization strategy.24
The federal government thus felt compelled to reassert its primacy over the
politics and policy of immigration through the highly unusual strategy of a
government-sponsored preemption lawsuit. In litigation, the administration
characterized Arizona as having made itself a "rival decisionmaker[] based on
disagreement with the focus and scope of federal enforcement," 2s reinforcing
the premise that state and local participation in this domain could only be at
the invitation of the federal government.26 The government's rhetoric of
(2012) (No. 11-182); see id. at 46. In a guidance document laying out its conception of law
enforcement cooperation, DHS made clear that state officials must be "responsive to federal
enforcement discretion," such that DHS could exert "control over enforcement" and
maintain flexibility to respond to "changing conditions," and that it was not appropriate for
state and local governments to adopt their own "set of directives to implement [their own]
enforcement policy." Guidance on State and Local Governments'Assistance, supra note 17, at 4.
23. Rooting out racial profiling has long been one of the priorities of the Department and is of
heightened concern to the current DOJ. See Civil Rights Div., Guidance Regarding the Use of
Race by Federal Law Enforcement Agencies, U.S. DEP'T JUST. (June 2003),
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/guidance_on-race.pdf; see also Matt
Apuzzo, U.S. to Expand Rules Limiting Use of Profiling by Federal Agents, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
15, 2014, http://www.nytimes.conV2ol4/ol/16/us/politics/us-to-expand-rules-limiting-use-of
-profiling-by-federal-agents.html.
24. In her essay for this Feature, Jessica Bulman-Pozen notes that, in defending its law, Arizona
claimed to be acting in full accord with the law as Congress had written it, thus stepping
onto one side of a federal debate. Bulman-Pozen, Afterlife, supra note 5, at 1936. Whether
this posture was strategic (to insulate the state law from preemption litigation) or sincere,
much of Arizona's enforcement drive was in substance inconsistent with the visions of the
Obama Administration and Democratic politicians in the current Congress, and even with
the bargains struck by the Congresses that had enacted various provisions of the
Immigration and Nationality Act. As the Supreme Court observed in Arizona, S.B. 1070
actually adopted regulatory strategies Congress had rejected, such as criminalizing work by
unauthorized immigrants themselves, rather than just the employer's decision to hire. See
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2503-05.
25. See Brief for the United States, supra note 22, at 22.
26. See id. at 7. In other aspects of its enforcement policy, the federal government has adopted a
similar position. It has chosen, for example, to terminate the 287(g) authority of Sheriff
Joseph Arpaio of Maricopa County, whose department also has been found by a district
court to have engaged in civil rights violations through racial profiling and enforcement
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control and supervision in the Arizona case could have just reflected its
particularly strong interest in maintaining primacy in a traditional federal
sphere. Despite the erosion of the spheres conception of federalism in doctrine
and practice, the federal government might still cling to its traditional
exclusivities. Or the government's positions could have been a function of the
especially oppositional behavior of Arizona and like-minded states. Whatever
its motivation, the lawsuit suggests the federal government will often want its
federalism both ways.
Developments in the drug policy arena suggest a slightly different, more
cooperative conception of control -that federal primacy can be maintained and
even served in the absence of monopoly. Numerous states have adopted
regulatory regimes meaningfully distinct from the federal Controlled
Substances Act (CSA), first by adopting exceptions to prohibitions on
marijuana use for medicinal purposes, and more recently by decriminalizing
sweeps. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Statement by Secretary
Janet Napolitano on DOJ's Findings of Discriminatory Policing in Maricopa County
(Dec. 15, 201n), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2on/12/15/secretary-napolitano-dojs-findings
-discriminatory-policing-maricopa-county ("Discrimination undermines law enforcement
and erodes the public trust. DHS will not be a party to such practices. Accordingly, and
effective immediately, DHS is terminating MCSO's 287(g) jail model agreement and is
restricting the Maricopa County Sheriffs Office access to the Secure Communities program.
DHS will utilize federal resources for the purpose of identifying and detaining those
individuals who meet U.S. Immigration Customs Enforcement's (ICE) immigration
enforcement priorities."). Other shifts in federal enforcement strategies reflect a desire to
utilize federalism's institutions while keeping its actors at bay. The Secure Communities
program, pursuant to which fingerprint data collected from state and local arrests and sent
to the FBI is made accessible to immigration officials through interoperable databases, uses
information collected by state and local enforcement officials without involving them
directly in immigration enforcement. For the government's summary of the program, see
Secure Communities, IMMIGR. & CUSTOMs ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/secure
communities (last visited Jan. 22, 2014). See also 8 U.S.C. 5 1722(a)(2) (2012) (requiring the
President to "develop and implement an interoperable electronic data system to provide
current and immediate access to information in databases of Federal law enforcement
agencies" to make immigration determinations). Eliminating state and local influence from
enforcement will be difficult, however; local law enforcement that might have an
immigration agenda could in theory still make arrests to advance that agenda; for example,
they could make arrests for minor offenses such as traffic violations in order to funnel
certain people into the immigration system. Cf Anil Kalhan, Immigration Policing and
Federalism Through the Lens of Technology, Surveillance, and Privacy, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1105,
n1o9 (forthcoming 2014) (noting the vast expansion of state and local involvement in
immigration policing that is resulting from Secure Communities and the corresponding
elimination of choice by states and localities as to their participation).
27. As of November 2012, eighteen states and the District of Columbia have enacted measures
that effectively decriminalize the use of marijuana for medicinal purposes by exempting
"qualified individuals" from prosecution. TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42398,
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use of marijuana even for recreational purposes while also authorizing its
production and sale, as in Colorado2 and Washington State.2 9 Both sets of
developments, but particularly the latter, could be said to disrupt the field of
federal enforcement. The state laws sanction marijuana use, thus giving rise to
an expanded market, and they deprive the federal government of the state and
local enforcement resources on which it historically has relied to serve the
purposes of the CSA. 3o
In response to these developments, the Obama DOJ has issued three
memoranda articulating how the federal government intends to enforce federal
law in the wake of state divergence. But what exactly those memoranda were
meant to accomplish remains unclear, perhaps intentionally so. On the one
hand, the memos have served to provide notice to state and local actors of
federal intentions31 - that consistent with its priorities the Department would
MEDICAL MARIJUANA: THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE, FEDERALISM, AND THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN
STATE AND FEDERAL LAWS 1 (Nov. 9,2012), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42398.pdf.
28. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16; see also id. § 16(i)(a) ("In the interest of the efficient use of
law enforcement resources, enhancing revenue for public purposes, and individual freedom,
the people of the state of Colorado find and declare that the use of marijuana should be legal
for persons twenty-one years of age or older and taxed in a manner similar to alcohol.").
29. WASH. REV. CODE 5 69.50.401(3) (2013) ("The production, manufacture, processing,
packaging, delivery, distribution, sale, or possession of marijuana in compliance with [the
legalization initiative] shall not constitute a violation of... any .. . provision of Washington
state law.").
3o. For a comprehensive discussion of the federalism implications of state marijuana
decriminalization, see Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and
the States' Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REv. 1421 (2009).
31. That notice may have been less than clear. The memo issued by Deputy Attorney General
David Ogden in particular appears to have induced a naYve reliance by eventual federal
defendants, who believed the federal government's articulation of its intent to exercise
discretion amounted to a kind of immunity from federal prosecution. See, e.g., United States
v. Hicks, 722 F. Supp. 2d 829, 833 (E.D. Mich. zoio) (observing that "[t]he Department of
Justice's discretionary decision [in the Ogden memorandum] to direct its resources
elsewhere does not mean that the federal government now lacks the power to prosecute
those who possess marijuana," and that Department officials' statements "cannot be
construed as affirmatively representing to Defendant that he is now authorized to possess or
use marijuana under federal law"); United States v. Stacy, 696 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1149 (S.D.
Cal. 2010) (finding that "federal prosecuting authorities are free to investigate or prosecute
individuals if, in their judgment, there is reason to believe that state law is being invoked to
mask the illegal production or distribution of marijuana" and that there would in any case
be no grounds "for dismissing an indictment because it is contrary to internal Department
of Justice guidelines"). Even public statements by the Attorney General have given rise to
such reliance, but the courts have rejected entrapment by estoppel claims based on those
statements. See Stacy, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 1147 ("Holder's statement that the Justice
Department 'had no plans' to prosecute pot dispensaries that were operating legally under
state laws was a loose statement that left open the possibility the Justice Department could
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continue to enforce the law. The Department identified certain federal "lines"
that it would continue to police, namely preventing distribution of marijuana
to minors; the diversion of revenues to cartels or criminal enterprises; and the
use of violence in the cultivation and distribution of marijuana.32 But because
its goals arguably have never included prosecuting minor possession offenses,
the federal government could also announce its intention to look the other way
with respect to much of the activity authorized by state law. This mixed
commitment to enforcement likely reflects the imperatives facing a law
enforcement agency, reconciled with political calculations concerning how best
to respond to shifts in public opinion regarding marijuana use and possession.
But while asserting control essentially by reserving it, the federal
government also struck a collaborative posture with states such as Colorado
and Washington different in kind from its definition of cooperation in the
immigration setting. Though similar in a certain spirit to the DHS guidance
issued during the S.B. 1070 litigation laying out the forms of state and local
assistance that constituted cooperation, the Department's drug policy also went
a step further by expressing a willingness to adjust federal policy in light of
how the state regulatory regimes play out in practice.33 Indeed, the fact that
Attorney General Holder rejected the aggressive preemption strategy adopted
in the immigration setting suggests that, in some settings, federal purposes and
even primacy can be maintained amidst cacophony on ultimate policy
objectives.
This tolerance for divergence could simply reflect the government's
calculation that state laws will not disrupt the federal enforcement status quo,
or it could stem from the federal government's own long-term interest in de-
escalating the drug war. The fact that a Democratic administration has taken
this position also underscores the role politics can play in the federal
government's construction of its power and its relationships with the states.
Whereas Arizona's immigration law, adopted in a highly partisan Republican
change its 'plans' or could choose to prosecute medical marijuana dispensaries on a case-by-
case basis.").
32. See, e.g., Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att'y Gen., to U.S. Attorneys,
Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement 2 (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.justice.gov
/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf.
33. See, e.g., id. at 3 ("In jurisdictions that have enacted laws legalizing marijuana in some form
and that have also implemented strong and effective regulatory and enforcement systems to
control the cultivation, distribution, sale, and possession of marijuana, conduct in
compliance with those laws and regulations is less likely to threaten . . . federal priorities
.... In those circumstances, consistent with the traditional allocation of federal-state efforts
in this area, enforcement of state laws by state and local law enforcement and regulatory
bodies should remain the primary means of addressing marijuana-related activity.").
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environment, was anathema to key political constituencies of the Obama
Administration, the movement to relax marijuana prohibitions, particularly for
medicinal purposes, does not threaten any such constituencies and may be in
line with the substantive preferences of the average voting Democrat (or even
American). Regardless of the reason for its position, the Department
acknowledged that its priorities could be maintained in the absence of
uniformity of policy. The very fact that the Cole memorandum suggests that
the federal government will think about prosecutions in states with effective
regulatory regimes differently from prosecutions in states that maintain
prohibitions suggests that local development can prompt variegated federal
action that nonetheless constitutes an integrated national enforcement strategy.
Both approaches to cooperation ultimately suggest that, no matter how
strong the desire to assert it, control will be elusive, and sometimes even
counterproductive, for at least three reasons. First, as I noted at the outset, the
federal government historically has relied on state and local actors as agents in
the development of federal policy, and the law is replete with delegation
strategies of numerous sorts.34 Regardless of the particular form it takes,35 as a
34. In addition to the so-called 287(g) agreements that enable state and local officials to perform
federal immigration functions, 8 U.S.C. § 1376(g) (2012), the law delegates authority to
states to make judgments concerning benefits eligibility for noncitizens, and federal removal
law itself depends on state criminal law predicates, which of course vary across jurisdictions
on their face and in their enforcement, such that removal policy itself is not uniform. For
recent literature documenting how criminal law enforcement choices made by state and local
actors affect the federal agenda by determining who is eligible for removal in ways that
reflect local preferences and values, see, for example, Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for
Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in Local Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1126 (2013); and
Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion that Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement, State and
Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLAL. REv. 1819 (2011).
3s. The decision to delegate, the form of delegation chosen by Congress, and the extent of the
Executive Branch's use of the delegation option will be in large part a function of politics
and not just institutional interest. For instance, a Republican Congress introduced the
287(g) program into the Immigration and Nationality Act in 1996, amidst a series of
reforms designed to strengthen enforcement and limit access to benefits by noncitizens, all
of which were signed by President Clinton as part of a larger triangulation strategy to help
assure reelection in a tough political environment. See, e.g., Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-3546
(codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.) (making removal more expeditious); The Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110
Stat. 2105 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.) (denying lawful permanent residents
access to certain means tested benefits and authorizing states to deny state benefits); Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.) (constricting habeas review, expanding
deportation grounds, and narrowing discretionary relief). Not coincidentally, the federal
bureaucracy did not start entering into 287(g) agreements in significant numbers until after
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method of regulation, delegation carries with it the possibility of divergence
from what the federal government, working through its own agents, might
choose to do. The federal government's embracing of the advantages of
delegation also reflects a degree of acceptance of the divergences it generates. In
some settings, the federal government will even have an affirmative interest in
the divergence itself. In implementing the No Child Left Behind Act,36 for
example, the Obama Administration has granted waivers of the law's
requirements to certain states. This strategy arguably helps facilitate states'
development of new strategies tailored to their own needs to meet the federal
law's requirements under federal supervision, thus using the tools of
administration to simultaneously calibrate regulatory burdens in the states'
interests and advance federal policy objectives.37 We may bemoan this
widespread delegation, following Michael Greve," as inconsistent with the
original design whereby states were to provide a check on the federal
government. Or, we may regard delegation strategies as reflecting lamentable
path-dependencies that stem from the original constitutional design but might
be less effective than comprehensive federal regulatory regimes.39 But the
federal interest in making use of the structures of federalism requires constant
adaptation and adjustment and therefore some limited loss of control. 40
September l, 2001, and under the Republican Bush Administration. See Cristina Rodriguez
et al., A Program in Flux: New Priorities and Implementation Challenges for 287(g), MIGRATION
POL'Y INST. 3 (2010). Though the current Administration has not eschewed this strategy, it
has clipped the authorities of certain local officials and shifted its attention to Secure
Communities. See supra note 26.
36. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified at scattered
sections of 20 U.S.C.).
37. See generally David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense ofBig Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REv.
265, 279-81 (2013) (describing the waivers, their statutory basis, and the alternate
requirements imposed on states receiving them).
38. MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE UPSIDE-DowN CONSTITUTION (2012).
3g. The implementation of the Affordable Care Act arguably reflects the pathology of delegation
strategies. Both the refusal by numerous states to create their own insurance exchanges and
to accept federal money to expand the coverage of Medicaid suggest the inefficiencies of
relying on state bureaucracies to accomplish federal ends, not only because supervision of
those bureaucracies will be challenging, but more importantly because partisan politics will
always threaten to scuttle well-laid technocratic plans.
40. That the federal government understands an ongoing need to conceptualize its power with
awareness of state and local interests is highlighted by the fact that the current Democratic
administration purports to respect states' concurrent authority, as well as the possibility that
states have often done a better job of advancing the public welfare than the federal
government (though of course the definition of public welfare is up for debate). See
Memorandum on Preemption, 2009 DAILY CoMP. PREs. Doc. 384, at *1 (May 20, 2009)
("The Federal Government's role in promoting the general welfare and guarding individual
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Second, because the federal government itself is not unitary in its views
about how the law should be enforced, its responses to developments in the
states can be complicated. Federal positions on federalism are often the product
of internal compromise. The formulation of the DOJ marijuana memos was
likely complicated by divergent interests that stemmed from institutional
"role." Whereas Attorney General Holder and other policy-makers might have
seen the long-term benefits of de-escalation, the bureaucratic culture and
professional interests of the officials of the DEA likely placed a heavy thumb on
the scale in favor of enforcement vigilance, thus leading to the open, non-
committal quality of the memos. Even the DHS memo on immigration
cooperation, designed to point up the conflict between Arizona's law and
federal policy, reflected an institutional commitment to some state and local
participation in immigration enforcement, another position likely reflective of
compromise between law enforcement and political and civil rights interests.
Further, certain actors within the federal system might prefer to work with
local partners to advance their own particular preferences, which might differ
from their superiors'. Devolution in immigration law enforcement highlights
this dynamic. Federal field agents might share more in common with state and
local officials interested in widespread enforcement, both for institutional and
partisan reasons. This tension between center and periphery does not justify
the latter in resisting the former, including through collaboration with more
like-minded state and local officials, but it does underscore the difficulty of
achieving a truly uniform enforcement policy.41
liberties is critical, but State law and national law often operate concurrently to provide
independent safeguards for the public. Throughout our history, State and local
governments have frequently protected health, safety, and the environment more
aggressively than has the national Government."). For an exploration of how this has played
out in practice, see Catherine M. Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, 110 MICH. L. REV. 521
527-29 (2012) (considering agency responses to the President's memorandum calling for
attention to state interests). In exploring federalism under the Obama Administration,
Gillian Metzger cites the government's interest in providing states with opportunities to
regulate in order to expand the capacities of government. See Metzger, supra note 18, at 598-
61o (detailing regulatory and financial opportunities for states and the move toward more
active government at the federal and state level).
41. A stark example of the potential for internal disagreement is the lawsuit brought by
Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents challenging the Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals policy adopted by DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano as a statement of
Department enforcement priorities. This conflict underscores that federal agents in the field
often take issue with the politically driven shifts in policy initiated by political appointees
and bureaucrats centered in Washington. For a discussion of the claims made in the lawsuit,
see Crane v. Napolitano, 920 F. Supp. 2d 7 24 , 730-31 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (granting in part and
denying in part the government's motion to dismiss); Crane v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-cv-
03247-0, 2013 WL 1744422 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2013) (deferring ruling on preliminary
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Finally, the very existence of state regulatory authority, as well as the
concurrent nature of much of federal and state authority, means state and local
lawmaking will challenge federal positions, requiring the federal government
to react. The preemption remedy will only infrequently be available, not least
because litigation is slow and costly. In fact, preemption may also not be
desirable. The federal government might have an interest in disharmony,
because state and local forays into fields that touch on federal interests can
provide the federal government with opportunities. Consider again the
marijuana debate. The federal government may well have an interest in de-
escalating the war on drugs. The Democratic politicians currently in charge
might favor decriminalization as a matter of policy, perhaps in order to reduce
incarceration rates and diminish drug-related violence abroad. Law
enforcement officials might share the interest in reducing violence and prefer a
world in which resources can be devoted to more dangerous public health
threats than those marijuana poses. But because of a variety of political and
institutional pressures, it cannot be the prime mover in that process. Much as I
have argued in other work that the federal government benefits from states and
localities fighting out the gory details of how to conceptualize illegal
immigration,42 the federal government may need a decentralized debate over
legalization.
The debates concerning marriage equality and the Defense of Marriage Act
also highlight the opportunities state-level divergence can create for the federal
government. If we take DOMA's rise and fall as the lens through which to view
the federal government's interest in the marriage equality debate, we can see
that the federal position has been ideological and partisan, as well as reactive,
and that the federal government has benefitted from state and local
governments taking the lead in promoting marriage equality. Both Congress's
enactment of DOMA in 1996 in response to developments in the states, and
the administration's decision not to defend DOMA in court in 2011, were
precipitated by decentralized developments throughout the country. In the case
of the latter, the President began his administration publicly opposed to same-
sex marriage. It therefore seems plausible that his and his administration's
evolution on the question was made possible by the growing momentum in
state and local governments in the direction that otherwise aligned with
the preferences of Democratic voters, or at least core principles of the
Democratic Party.
injunction); and Crane v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-cV-03247-O, slip op. at 7 (N.D. Tex. July 31,
2013), http://www.law.uh.edu/ihelg/documents/Crane207-31-13.pdf (dismissing plaintiffs'
claims for lack ofjurisdiction).
42. See Rodriguez, supra note 8.
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More concretely, in response to these decentralized trends, the
administration began a concerted effort in June 2010 to require the bureaucracy
to do what it could with administrative tools, within the confines of DOMA, to
extend federal benefits to same-sex partners.43 After the Supreme Court's
invalidation of DOMA in 2013-a decision grounded largely in equal protection
principles but informed by developments at the state and local level4- the
administration innovated still further. For example, DHS, backed up by DOJ,
now permits U.S. persons to sponsor their same-sex spouses for admission to
the country.45 As this essay went to press, the Attorney General took perhaps
the boldest stance yet by the Department in relation to federal law. He declared
that the federal government would recognize same-sex marriages performed in
Utah pursuant to a district court order, extending benefits to same-sex spouses
of federal employees married before the Supreme Court stayed the district
court decision.46  The Attorney General aligned this move with the
43. Memorandum on Extension of Benefits to Same-Sex Domestic Partners of Federal
Employees, 2010 DAILY CoMp. PRES. Doc. 450, at *1 (June 2, 2010) ("[Slystemic inequality
[in the provision of benefits] undermines the health, well-being, and security not just of our
Federal workforce, but also of their families and communities," such that administrative
action should be taken "to the extent permitted by law," even though "legislative action is
necessary to provide full equality.").
44. The basis for the Court's invalidation of DOMA is difficult to pinpoint, as the Court's
opinion veers between equal protection and federalism rhetoric throughout. But whether
federalism concerns constituted a basis for the holding (I argue elsewhere the opinion
turned on Fourteenth Amendment analysis, see Rodriguez, supra note 6 (manuscript at 34-
36)), the challenge to the federal statute arose and became publicly salient because of the
rapid progression of same-sex marriage through the states in the last decade.
45. For the DHS position on the matter, see Implementation of the Supreme Court Ruling on the
Defense of Marriage Act, U.S. DEP'T HOMEIAND SECURITY, http://www.dhs.gov/topic
/implementation-supreme-court-ruling-defense-marriage-act (last visited Jan. 23, 2014)
(quoting former Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano's statement that "effective
immediately, I have directed U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to review
immigration visa petitions filed on behalf of a same-sex spouse in the same manner as those
filed on behalf of an opposite-sex spouse"). For the adjudication of the issue by the Board of
Immigration Appeals within the Department of Justice, see Oleg B. Zeleniak, 26 I. & N. Dec.
158, 159-60 (2013) ("The Supreme Court's ruling in Windsor has therefore removed section 3
of the DOMA as an impediment to the recognition of lawful same-sex marriages and
spouses if the marriage is valid under the laws of the State where it was celebrated. . . . The
Director has already determined that the petitioner's ... marriage is valid under the laws of
Vermont, where the marriage was celebrated.").
46. In his statement announcing the decision, the Attorney General framed it as another step on
the road to equality and declared that families consisting of same-sex spouses should not be
asked to endure uncertainty as litigation unfolds. See Statement by Attorney General Eric
Holder on Federal Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages in Utah, U.S. DEP'T JUST. (Jan. 10, 2014),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2ol4January/14-ag-o31.html. From his point of view, it was
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Department's substantive equal protection agenda, despite ambiguous signals
coming from the governor's office about the legal status of those marriages
under state law.47 He thus untethered, if only slightly, the federal position from
the state one. In its domain, then, the federal government has been able to
advance civil rights principles now held (and perhaps long held) by its leaders
that redound to the benefit of its employees.48 These positions arguably have
been made possible by developments in the states and have grown bolder as
the debate has unfolded through dialogue between and among state and
federal institutions.
As the Obama Administration's actions have shown in the immigration and
drug policy contexts, not to mention DOMA, full enforcement of the law and
federal dominance are often not the salient federal interests within the federal
system. Federalism can ultimately provide the federal government with
opportunities to extend its influence and capacities. Decentralized conflict can
work to its advantage. 49 To be sure, as the case of S.B. 1070 suggests,
enough for a federal district court to have declared the state's prohibition on same-sex
marriages unconstitutional to create a state-law status the federal government could
recognize for its own ends.
47. In a statement issued on January 9, 2014, the Attorney General of Utah recommended that
county clerks provide marriage certificates to all persons married before the district court
order was stayed, "as an administrative function and not a legal function," in part so same-
sex couples could have "proper documentation in states that recognize same-sex marriage."
Attorney General Sean D. Reyes Counsels County Attorneys and County Clerks in Utah, UTAH
Arr'Y GEN. (Jan. 9, 2014), http://attorneygeneral.utah.gov/2014/os/09/attorney-general
-sean-d-reyes-counsels-county-attorneys-and-county-clerks-in-utah. This statement could
mean that the state recognizes the marriages in question, at least on some level, even if state
benefits do not flow from that recognition. In a statement on January 8, the governor's chief
of staff indicated that the state would not recognize same-sex marriages pending final
judicial resolution of the issue, though the statement made clear that it was not intended to
opine on the legal status of those marriages. Governor's Office Gives Direction to State Agencies
on Same-Sex Marriages, UTAH Gov. GARY HERBERT (Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.utah.gov
/governor/news media/article.html ?article= 9617.
48. In the Presidential Memorandum announcing the government's decision to expand benefits
to same-sex partners before it decided not to defend DOMA in court, the President
emphasized that the "systemic inequality [in the provision of benefits caused by DOMA]
undermines the health, well-being, and security not just of our Federal workforce, but also
of their families and communities." Memorandum on Extension of Benefits, supra note 43,
at *1.
49. This perspective provides a different spin on yet another role claimed for the federal
government by commentators -that the central government ought to, or will want to,
protect states from one another by policing their imposition of externalities or spillovers on
their neighbors through judicial or legislative preemption or ad hoc executive action. The
Department of Justice has articulated preventing diversion of marijuana to jurisdictions that
have not legalized it as among its enforcement priorities, for example. See Memorandum
2113
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
federalism can also create obstacles to the realization of federal goals. But the
framework for negotiation the system creates makes these obstacles
surmountable and the need to assert primacy real but not totalizing.
II. STATE AND LOCAL INTERESTS IN OPPORTUNITY AND INFLUENCE
Articulating the value of federalism from the standpoint of sub-federal
governments might seem like a strange enterprise, given that those entities owe
their very existence to the Framers' choice to create a federal system in the first
place. But much as the previous Part explored what use the federal government
might have for state and local actors, and when it might seek to keep those
governments at bay, here we can ask how states and localities approach their
relationships not only with the center, but also with each other. Three basic
features of the federalist system will be relevant to exploring this sub-federal
perspective on federalism: the existence of a strong central government with
the power to displace most state and local regulation; the decisional and
jurisdictional independence of states and localities; and the horizontal
relationships and effects that drive a great deal of politics and policy in a federal
system.
Even still, the question of federalism's value will be difficult to answer,
because of the density of the system: the sub-federal encompasses multiple
sovereigns with varying degrees of power. Though in theory the fifty states
stand on something resembling equal footing,50 the vast disparities in their size
affect the extent of the their influence in national debates and in relation to the
federal government during tugs-of-war over enforcement. Think of the
capacity of the state of Texas to determine the content of school textbooks for
national audiences given its share of the market and of California's ability to
from James M. Cole, supra note 32, at 1. Given that the federal government can have an
interest in conflict, I am skeptical that this interest in horizontal policing stands on its own
two feet. Instead, it arises primarily to the extent that the policing of a given externality
coincides with the federal government's own interests or policy preferences. Because federal
intervention will necessarily require preferring one state's choice to another, the idea that
the federal government stands in to protect the integrity of federalism itself makes little
sense. Moreover, it may well be the case that the federal government's interests coincide
with the imposition of externalities, as may be the case in the marijuana debate and is almost
certainly the case with respect to gay marriage. In recent work, Heather Gerken and Ari
Holtzblatt make a convincing affirmative case for spillovers of certain kinds. See Heather K.
Gerken & Ari Holtzblatt, The Political Safeguards of Horizontal Federalism, 112 MICH. L. REv.
(forthcoming 2014).
so. For a critique of the notion that the federal government must treat states equally, see
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drive environmental regulation.5' As a result, the ideal vision of federalism,
both as a system of dual sovereignty and as a system of inter-governmental
relations, is likely to appear different across states. In addition, if we
decentralize past the state level to the regional and the local,52 the possibility of
conflicting interests and multiplicity of relationships among governments
proliferates. New York City and Los Angeles may be able to attract national
si. For an account of California's leadership role, see Ann E. Carlson, Regulating Capacity and
State Environmental Leadership: California's Climate Policy, 24 FoRDHAM ENvTL. L. REv. 63
(2013). See also Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 Nw. U. L. REv.
1097, 1099-100 (2009) (exploring how the federal government has effectively chosen certain
states to be leaders in experimenting with environmental regulations); J.R. DeShazo & Jody
Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The Case of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L.
REv. 1499, 1500-38 (2007) (discussing state environmental regulation and the possibility
that states intend to provoke federal action).
52. In Federalism All the Way Down, Heather Gerken highlights the importance of decentralized
social institutions in harnessing the values of decentralized debate, including how they
promote dissent and provide minorities with the opportunity to govern. Heather K. Gerken,
The Supreme Court 2oo Term-Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARv. L. REV. 4
(2010). In thinking through the value of decentralization to the project of national
integration, I also have focused on the role of what I call mid-level social institutions, such
as the workplace and the public schools, which need not be state actors but through which
critical regulatory and policy decisions that shape our national character are made. See
Cristina M. Rodriguez, Language and Participation, 94 CALIF. L. REv. 687 (2oo6). Realizing
the values of decentralization thus does not require a federal system. Even if the sub-federal
institution in question is a public body of a sort, its significance does not necessarily flow
from the fact that it is attached to a particular sovereign (e.g., public schools). What is more,
within a national system, plenty of agency problems exist such that there will be politically
charged, differing views as to policy and implementation questions. Decentralization and its
benefits are therefore possible within a unitary system.
In this essay, however, I focus on governmental institutions with lawmaking power, in
order to focus on power-sharing dynamics and to explore the significance and value of
federalism as a system of government, as distinct from decentralization as a governing
strategy that will be present to some extent in any complex society. So what is it about
federalism, as opposed to decentralization, that is distinctive? Perhaps a federal system's
salient feature is the existence of semi-independent, power-wielding structures through
which debates and policy decentralization can happen, the results of which will be
instantiated in law. Whether to include local governments within a definition of federalism
presents a tricky question. Local governments exist in unitary systems, of course, and
localities in the United States are creatures of state law. But local governments are
governments in that they enact their own laws and engage in their own administration,
sometimes consistent with and at other times at odds with their state and federal "masters."
See also infra notes 61-66 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the relevance of local
government in constitutional interpretation, see David Barron, Why (and When) Cities Have
a Stake in Enforcing the Constitution, 115 YALE L.J. 2218, 2249 (2006) (using San Francisco's
challenge to California's marriage laws as a lens through which to consider localist
interpretations of the Constitution that seek to "afford cities the space to make their own
choices through the practice of local politics").
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audiences and resist encroachments on their prerogatives by their creators and
supervisors in the state legislature, but among the most interesting and
important federalism dynamics scholars have begun to explore of late is the
divergence between state and local interests and the use of state power to
flatten the latter.s3 Finally, as I have emphasized in the immigration context,
public opinion at the sub-federal level is better characterized by diversity than
homogeneity, our political shorthand of blue states and red states
notwithstanding.s4 The debates that rage across the country also occur within
states themselves, no matter how ideologically coherent the state might seem
on the electoral map. And so whereas it is possible to speak semi-coherently
about the interests of the federal government, it will be far more difficult to
speak in the abstract about the interests of states and localities within the
federal system.
Despite this complexity, it should still be useful to evaluate federalism's
virtues from the sub-federal point of view, because states and localities must all
negotiate their relationship with a higher level of government. I therefore
assess the potential values of the system to sub-federal entities in the
discretionary spaces where these negotiations occur: when the federal
government has invited states or localities into a regulatory scheme; and when
states or localities seek to take positions using their regulatory powers that
might put them in the crosshairs of other governments, not just in a manner
susceptible to preemption, but also in a way that might force the federal
government's enforcement hand. Without wholly discounting the ways
Supreme Court doctrine has cabined federal power since the Rehnquist era,55 I
also assume that our central government is remarkably powerful. It has a
broad regulatory reach that states themselves might embrace, to the extent they
want the federal government to solve collective action problems or take charge
of policy problems on their plates. That said, states themselves retain
considerable decisional independence in the exercise of their regulatory
53. I have discussed this dynamic in the immigration context. See Rodriguez, supra note 8, at
636-40; see also Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an
Era ofState Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REv. 959 (2007).
54. Rodriguez, supra note 8, at 576-80.
5s. The doctrinal uncertainty Alison LaCroix explores in her essay for this Feature, see LaCroix,
supra note 2, underscores that we might expect further constitutional limits on federal
power. Their extent will in part depend on whether and how Spending Clause litigation
curtails the federal government's power to design regulatory schemes to expand its
capacities through the states, or whether the Supreme Court's judgment in NFIB v. Sebelius
was specific enough to the Affordable Care Act, which itself contained novel forms of
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authority, because of the discretion the federal government exercises when
wielding its own power, as well as the practical and political constraints on the
federal government's reach.
When it comes to federal invitations to cooperate, state and local interests
align to a substantial degree with the federal. Rather than think of the federal
government as a rival, states and localities will often (if not usually) think of it
as the bearer of benefits. Joint federal-state operations and delegation schemes
enable the lower levels of government to develop close ties to federal
regulators, which in turn can help states expand their capacity to solve
problems. The integrated scheme of disaster relief offers a good example of this
benefit of federalism. Though recognizing the states' frontline police powers,
federal law enables governors to declare states of emergency and thus trigger
federal assistance, leaving the power of initiation in the hands of states but
providing invaluable opportunities to expand states' capacities to respond to
disasters.s6 Through mechanisms such as joint law enforcement task forces and
federal committees that include state and local officials, sub-federal actors gain
access to useful information either generated by the federal government or
pooled from disparate local sources by federal entities. Perhaps most valuably,
as Abbe Gluck shows in her work on the Affordable Care Act, state actors can
help shape federal regimes and priorities through their participation in joint
regulatory exercises57 - a phenomenon not lost on state and local bureaucrats
who participate in immigration enforcement either58
56. See Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Pub. L. 93-288, 88
Star. 143 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. SS 5121-5207 (20o6)). In fact, numerous
states have enacted so-called peace officer and state deputation laws, which purport to
empower federal officials to make state law arrests in certain circumstances, which the
Department of Justice has found to conform to the general rule that federal authority to
make arrests must be expressly provided for by law. See Virginia A. Seitz, State and Local
Deputation ofFederal Officials During Stafford Act Deployments, OFF. LEGAL COUNSEL (Mar. 5,
2012), http://www.justice.gov/olc/2012/state-local-fleo-stafford-act-deployments.pdf, 2012
WL 1123840.
57. See Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism, supra note i; see also Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K.
Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256 (2009) (discussing how cooperative
federalism schemes put skeptics within the Executive Branch in ways that can challenge and
push the development of federal policy). The recent literature on administrative federalism
also highlights this dynamic, and much of it emphasizes how state participation in federal
administration can work to preserve states' regulatory interests. See, e.g., Brian Galle & Mark
Seidenfeld, Administrative Law's Federalism: Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of
Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933 (2008); Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New
Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023, 2080-83 (20o8). For a challenge to this point of view and the
idea that states retain meaningful autonomy, emphasizing instead that they carry the mantle
of federal policy, see Bulman-Pozen, Afterlhfe, supra note 5, at 1935-40.
s. In a 2011 study, researchers documented how local law enforcement officials shaped the
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These possibilities generated by federalism will seem advantageous to state
and local actors for high and low reasons. As a source of funding and technical
support, the federal government ultimately enables states to expand their
regulatory power and capacity to address the needs of their citizenry and
amplify local policy preferences. Intertwinement with the federal government
can also serve state politicians' interest in re-election (federalism provides
opportunities for advancing personal ambition, after all) and satisfy politicians'
and bureaucrats' sense of professional obligation and reputational pride. The
handful of instances in which states reject federal funds reflects the value of
this relationship to state and local officials (though some might decry it as
dependency).
To be sure, whether state and local actors will see the federal government
as a source of opportunity will depend at times on partisan alignments. The
states that have rejected the Medicaid expansion under the Affordable Care Act
are all Republican-run. And yet, not all Republican governors have rejected the
Medicaid funds, and we have reason to believe there will be less non-
cooperation than feared after the Supreme Court's unexpected decision
enabling states to reject the Medicaid expansion without losing all program
funds, though perhaps greater levels of non-cooperation than we have seen
historically.59 But in many instances, the party in control of the federal
administration will matter less to the choice to enter cooperative schemes or
accept federal funds than the substantive domain in question and how
regulation in that field generally aligns with ideological or partisan preferences.
distribution of detainers issued under the 287(g) program. See Randy Capps et al.,
Delegation and Divergence: A Study of 287(g) State and Local Immigration Enforcement,
MIGRATION POL'Y INST. (Jan. 2011), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/287g-divergence
.pdf. State officials can also take advantage of flexible cooperative schemes to achieve
important policy objectives of their own. In January 2011, New York Governor Andrew
Cuomo launched a Medicaid Redesign Team to rethink the state's delivery of services under
the program, which eventually led the state to seek a waiver from the federal government to
pursue its reform goals. See A Plan to Transform the Empire State's Medicaid Program:
Better Care, Better Health, Lower Costs, N.Y. STATE DEP'T HEALTH 4-5 (May 2012),
http://www.health.ny.gov/health_care/medicaid/redesign/docs/mrtfinalreport.pdf.
59. In a recent working paper, Nicole Huberfeld documents that reports of non-participation
have been overstated by the media and that many Republican governors are working toward
implementation of the Medicaid expansion, despite hostility from state legislators and
opposition by the national party. Her account highlights the sort of negotiation that
characterizes many cooperative schemes. See Nicole Huberfeld, Dynamic Expansion (Nov.
22, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). It also is consistent with dynamics
I have highlighted in the immigration context, namely that executive and administrative
actors sometimes behave less ideologically than their counterparts in the legislature when
addressing the practical realities of phenomena such as illegal immigration. See Rodriguez,
supra note 8, at 579-90.
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Think, for example, of the fact that states and localities that skew Democratic
have resisted participation in immigration enforcement even within the Obama
Administration, and that those that skew Republican have maintained their
enthusiastic involvement in enforcement to the extent permitted by the current
Administration.6o
For state and local officials, there also will be value to a system of
federalism that safeguards their decisional independence and capacities for
regulation, and here the state interest in federalism has the potential to diverge
from the federal, though not as significantly as might seem initially intuitive.'
On a simultaneously quotidian and high-minded level, independent
lawmaking authority creates an institutional framework to address local
problems that might not otherwise register with a centralized bureaucracy,
particularly in a vast nation-state, in ways that more closely reflect the
preferences of the local constituency being served."2 But the federal system also
creates a valuable antagonist for state and local officials. Asserting
independence from the center, even in ways that conflict with federal policy,
can enhance the reputation and professional interests discussed above.'3
The governing figureheads of Arizona's anti-immigration movement, such
as Governor Janice Brewer14 and Sheriff Joe Arpaio of Maricopa County, or
California Governor Jerry Brown, who recently signed a slew of state laws
designed to make life easier in California for unauthorized immigrants,6 s or
6o. More problematic from the federal government's point of view is arguably the number of
states that have declined to establish insurance exchanges under the Affordable Care Act,
leaving the federal government to pick up the slack. Ideological opposition likely accounts
for much of this resistance, as does the desire to avoid the regulatory burden.
61. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text (evaluating the federal interest in disharmony).
62. In theory, a field office of a central bureaucracy could do the same, but given a federal
government such as ours in which partisanship affects bureaucratic choices -indeed, where
the political accountability of the administration is cited as justification for delegation to
administrative actors - a federalist structure likely will better serve these ends.
63. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 57.
64. In August 2012, Governor Brewer issued an order denying drivers' licenses to recipients of
relief under the federal government's Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals initiative.
After being rebuffed on equal protection grounds by a district court for denying DACA
recipients licenses, while granting them to recipients of garden-variety deferred action, see
Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 945 F. Supp. 2d 1049 (D. Ariz. 2013), the state opted to
level its policy down and deny the benefit to all aliens with the deferred action designation.
65. See, e.g., CAL. S. RuLES COMM., BILL ANALYSIs, A.B. 1024, 2013 Sess., at 5, http://leginfo.ca.gov
/pub/13-14/bill/asm/ablool-ioso/ab_1o24_cfa_20130911-175859_senfloor.html (making
explicit the intent of the legislature that "all individuals who meet the state law
qualifications for the practice of law in California be affirmatively eligible to apply for and
obtain a law license regardless of their citizenship or immigration status," thus satisfying the
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New York's crusaders against Wall Street, such as former Attorney General
and Governor Eliot Spitzer, traffic in the rhetoric of federal failure to frame
their own regulatory projects."6 Their use of this trope highlights how the
federal system creates political opportunities, even when accusations of federal
failure or indifference might be unfounded. These moments can turn into wins
for local constituents, to the extent the contrast helps propel policy innovation
in line with their preferences, and they can advance the objectives of the larger
social movements that are often behind state and local assertions of
independence,6 7 which might in turn enhance the profiles and political
horizons of state and local actors. 8
While these uses of independent state power might be connected to
advancing party interests on a larger scale, or to establishing a national profile
for the local official, they also often will reflect genuine policy disagreements
with the center. Having independent decision-making authority thus enables
state and local officials to address local problems in the manner they see fit.
Take for example immigration enforcement. For decades, local officials across
the country have attempted to constrain federal enforcement of immigration
law to protect local communities using forms of local power. New York City
requirements of federal law); CAL. S. RULES COMM., BILL ANALYSIS, S.B. 150, 2013 Sess.,
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/sen/sb-olo-oi5o/sbi5o cfa_20130507_104309
senfloor.html (creating nonresident tuition exemptions for unauthorized immigrant
students to participate in concurrent enrollment programs with secondary schools and
community colleges). Cf Gov. EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., VETO OF A.B. 1401, 2013 Sess.,
http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/asm/ab_1401-145o/ab_1401_vt_20131007.html ("Jury
service, like voting, is quintessentially a prerogative and responsibility of citizenship. This
bill would permit lawful permanent residents who are not citizens to serve on a jury. I don't
think that's right.").
66. Examples of this sort of value generated by the federal system include the decisions by
politicians to openly and loudly reject the Medicaid expansion of the Affordable Care Act, or
Arizona's ongoing battle with the federal government over illegal immigration through its
refusal to grant drivers' licenses to recipients of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals.
67. For a discussion of the connections between state and local assertions of authority and larger
national movements, see infra notes 73-76. See also Bulman-Pozen, Afterlife, supra note 5, at
1952-56 (discussing national movements' work through particular states in the debate over
marijuana legalization); Judith Resnik et al., Ratifying Kyoto at the Local Level: Sovereigntism,
Federalism, and Translocal Organizations of Government Actors (TOGAs), 50 Aluz. L. REV. 709
(2008) (describing states as a "collective national force").
68. Heather Gerken argues that one of the virtues of federalism, from the perspective of state
and local actors, is that the platform their decision-making authorities provide amplifies the
influence or impact of their policies and ideas. See Heather K. Gerken, The Loyal Opposition,
123 YALE L.J. 1958, 1980 (2014) (noting also that decentralization "gives dissenters a chance
to ... show how [a policy] work[s] in practice," which "matters in policymaking").
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mayors such as Rudolph Giuliani and Michael Bloomberg adopted variations
on policies that limited communication of immigration status information by
local officials to the federal government.6 9 Today, state and local actors such as
Governor Jerry Brown of California and Mayor Rahm Emmanuel of Chicago
have signed state and local measures that decline to honor federal detainers, or
requests that local police maintain custody of a person the federal government
has identified for arrest under its immigration laws.70 Though most supporters
of these sorts of measures have been Democrats (but see Giuliani and
Bloomberg), their adoption appears indifferent to which party controls the
federal bureaucracy and reflects the particular interests of local qua local
officials.
Of course, the very fact of sub-federal multiplicity and complexity can also
stymie the interests of local actors. Local government law scholars have
contributed a vital perspective to our understanding of the value of federalism
by highlighting the localization of preferences and the value of more localized
decision-making, 7' emphasizing that state bureaucracies and legislatures can be
remote from electorates and operate in ways that flatten out points of popular
disagreement.72 But as I have written in relation to immigration federalism,
69. See Rodriguez, supra note 8, at 6oo-o5.
70. See Chi., Ill., Ordinance S02012-4984 (Sept. 12, 2012), http://chicagocouncilmatic.org
/legislation/1156327 ("The cooperation of the City's immigrant communities is essential to
prevent and solve crimes and maintain public order, safety and security in the entire City.
One of the City's most important goals is to enhance the City's relationship with the
immigration communities."); id. ("Unless acting pursuant to a legitimate law enforcement
purpose that is unrelated to the enforcement of civil immigration law, no agency or agent
shall: (A) permit ICE agents access to a person being detained by, or in the custody of, the
agency or agency; (B) [give] ICE agents use of agency facilities for investigative interview or
other purposes; (C) while on duty, expend their time responding to ICE inquiries."). For an
account of the California law, see Daniel C. Vock, Capping String of Victories for Immigrants,
Brown Signs California Trust Act, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS: STATELINE (Oct. 7, 2013),
http://www.pewstates.org/projects/stateline/headlines/capping-string-of-victories-for-immigrants
-brown-signs-california-trust-act-8589951018 9.
7i. Though local governments are creatures of state law and therefore do not fit within a
traditional or strictly constitutional conception of federalism, as decision-makers with
lawmaking authority and enforcement powers, the arms of local government fit comfortably
within the framework of negotiated federalism explored here.
72. Nestor Davidson has written about how localities can form alliances with the federal
government through cooperative schemes and thereby protect their interests. Nestor M.
Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era of State Sovereignty, 93
VA. L. REV. 959 (2007). This possibility highlights the numerous forms of competition
among governing actors and popular constituencies that arise in federal systems, which
makes it challenging to "pick" a preferred level of government. For discussion of how cities
should be understood as fitting into federalism frameworks, see Loren King, Cities,
Subsidiarity, and Federalism, in FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY: NOMOS LV, supra note 1
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just as federal officials might seek either to tamp down or unleash sub-federal
activism, depending on how it serves federal objectives, state officials will face
similar incentives. The phenomenon of state-level preemption of local laws not
only demonstrates how state-level political communities are themselves
internally diverse, but also highlights how giving effect to decentralization "all
the way down" will be challenging. Though this dilemma merits close
consideration, the most important element of this dynamic for my purposes
here is that it demonstrates the importance of institutional position to thinking
through how decentralization should take institutional form.
Finally, the value of federalism to state and local actors does not stem
exclusively from the vertical dynamic-the perpetuation of localized decision-
making and the preservation of local preferences on the one hand and the
forging of relationships with the federal government on the other. Among the
most important elements of the federal system that legal scholars have only
recently begun to explore is the horizontal one. The forms of influence,
cooperation, and competition that flow across the local often do so without
direct engagement of the federal government or federal interests.73 Indeed, the
(manuscript at 3) (arguing that cities are the most important way people experience political
decisions); and Daniel Weinstock, Cities and Federalism, in FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY:
NOMOS LV, supra note 1 (manuscript at 13-14, 19, 27-30) (calling for greater constitutional
standing for cities on various grounds, including that access to knowledge is greater at the
local level, that urban density means individuals inter-relate more with one another, and
that cities have distinct political cultures from broader society).
73. In Rodriguez, supra note 6, I explore in detail how state courts, moneyed interests, and
various forms of association, including political parties, link local sites together in policy
conversation, sometimes with a view to federal policy but often with a focus only on the
substantive issue at hand. I highlight the work of scholars who have explored these
dynamics through a preoccupation with controlling externalities. See, e.g., Allan Erbsen,
Horizontal Federalism, 93 MINN. L. REv. 493, 529-60 (2oo8) (mapping the various
constitutional doctrines that structure state-to-state relations); Gillian E. Metzger, Congress,
Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 HARv. L. REv. 1468, 1474, 1478 (2007) (calling
attention to the fact that "the Court has scarcely addressed the question of Congress's
powers in the interstate context" and arguing that such inquiry is vital, because "[s]ome
national umpire over interstate relations is essential to ensure union"); Donald H. Regan,
Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce Clause
Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1865, 1884-85 (1987) (arguing
that the extraterritoriality principle that attempts to regulate states' extraterritorial behavior
operates across many bodies of case law but is ill defined and inadequately justified); Mark
D. Rosen, Extraterritoriality and Political Heterogeneity in American Federalism, 150 U. PA. L.
REV. 855 (2002). But I align my narrative instead with the normative agenda in recent work
by Heather Gerken and Ari Holtzblatt, who call for an affirmative account of the value of
inter-state spillovers, see Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 49, fundamentally because I
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policy goals of state and local actors might often be better served through the
horizontal forms of information-sharing and influence that a federal system
makes possible and robust. Officials can be connected to like-minded
politicians and bureaucrats in different states through the kinds of inter-
governmental networks Judith Resnik and co-authors have written about.74 In
addition, lobbying groups, public interest organizations, and policy
entrepreneurs have been central in putting certain issues (marijuana
legalization, immigration restriction, gun rights, and gay marriage, for
example) on a national agenda by working through state and local
governments with receptive electorates and institutional frameworks that make
law reform possible, 75 in turn enabling local officials to advance their policy
preferences and political profiles.76
74. For a rich and detailed account of the numerous types of associations of this kind that
incorporate governmental actors, see Judith Resnik et al., supra note 67, at 728-33. The
associations that fit into this category include the National Governors Association, the
National Association of Counties, the National League of Cities, the U.S. Conference of
Mayors, the Council of State Governments, and various similar associations organized
around party affiliation, regional affiliation, or racial and ethnic identity groups. Id. at 731.
75. These networks take on varying forms. Some are organized as multi-issue umbrella
networks, such as the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC); others are single-
issue, expressly ideological organizations, such as the NRA (though the umbrella
organizations also tend to have ideological bents); and still others provide technical support
to state and local officials. (Thank you to Alex Hemmer for this typology.) The best known
example of the first sort of network-ALEC-has been in operation since 1973 with the goal
of working to "advance the Jeffersonian fundamental principles of free-markets, limited
government, federalism, and individual liberty among America's state legislators" through
"public-private partnership" and has been criticized for receiving most of its contributions
from corporations. See, e.g., Corporate America's Trojan Horse in the States: The Untold Story
Behind the American Legislative Exchange Council, DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE & NAT. RESOURCE
DEF. COUNCIL 4, 20, 39 (2002), http://alecwatch.org/11223344.pdf. The network has been
highly effective at circulating model legislation to state legislatures. For a discussion of the
mobilization of these sorts of networks at the state level in pushing abortion restrictions, see
Reva B. Siegel, The Right's Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of Woman-Protective
Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641 (20o8); cf Miriam Seifter, States as Interest Groups
in the Administrative Process, ioo VA. L. REv. (forthcoming 2014) (exploring the federalism
implications of trans-local networks).
76. In her essay for this Feature, Jessica Bulman-Pozen highlights an especially salient
manifestation of how interests transcend local jurisdictions -the phenomenon of out-of-
state campaign contributions to state and local elections. Bulman-Pozen, Afterlife, supra note
5, at 1953-54. The affiliation voters in one state might feel with politicians in another might
signal the gradual disappearance of local interests, though feeling connections with
politicians from other jurisdictions is not mutually exclusive with the existence of local
identity, even as it highlights a horizontal benefit of federalism in the creation of alliances
with other politicians and constituencies.
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These mechanisms of policy diffusion have been controversial. They are
often made up of highly ideologically motivated groups. They can seem
opportunistic in that they grow up not from localized interests but from
moneyed networks that transcend any given local setting. They seek to extend
their influence by shopping around template laws to potentially receptive state
legislatures." In other words, the influence of such groups challenges the idea
that local actors have interests peculiar to their context, undermining
democratic justifications for federalism based on the system's capacity to
enable local expressions of popular will. Local interests can be constructed and
even co-opted by larger networks. But the fact of our increasing inter-
connection, enabled by technology and the evolution of trans-local
associations, also highlights a different function of federalism-that it creates
an inter-governmental connective tissue of benefit not only to local actors who
derive support and even status from these inter-jurisdictional dynamics, but
also of benefit to people who share the views amplified through these
networks - a possibility whose value I explore in more depth in Part III.
For state and local actors, then, federalism generates opportunities. But
those chances to serve both constituents' needs and their own ambitions
depend on a high degree of integration, both vertically and horizontally. That
is not to say that the desire to assert independence from the center, including
when it does not serve federal interests, won't be strong, particularly when it
does serve partisan objectives. But the very tensions the system creates will
themselves be productive, and ultimately the variable nature of the relationship
will produce value.
III. THE POPULAR INTEREST IN MULTI-LEVEL POLITICS
The final perspective on federalism I explore in this essay requires asking
what the value of the federal system might be to the people whom it represents
and regulates. For a variety of reasons, the official interests in federalism will
not necessarily map onto the popular ones. To the extent that officials
approach the negotiations required by a federal system with a view to
preserving either institutional prerogatives or advancing reputational
or partisan objectives, the particular arrangements they strike might not serve
7. For accounts of such groups' work in the immigration setting and evidence that partisanship
in particular explains the emergence of state and local immigration laws, see Pratheepan
Gulasekaram & S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, Immigration Federalism: A Reappraisal, 88
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 2074, 2126-29 (2013); and S. Karthick Ramakrishnan & Pratheepan
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popular interests directly at all. But attempting to define popular interests
could be futile, as they are enormously varied and emanate from the multiple
and overlapping political communities that exist in any large and diverse
republic.
It also might be hard to escape the banal observation that popular
constituencies' objectives are best served by national regulation some of the
time, such as when those constituencies make up a national majority, or when
their state and local governments lack capacity or will, and local regulation at
other times. More cynically, it might be tempting to think of federalism as
nothing more than a procedural framework for opportunistic ideological
struggle? Perhaps federalism provides nothing more than a set of platforms
for interest groups and the politically mobilized to shop policies and
preferences around to receptive governments in hopes of advancing a policy
agenda and perhaps eventually capturing a national majority, whether through
statehouses or Congress. 79 A turn to federal power may be on balance
preferable if its institutions are receptive to one's policy goals. But localism
becomes appealing when federal action remains elusive, either for partisan
political reasons or because of the relative difficulty of securing congressional
action or even influencing executive decision-making.
Though these observations suggest that there may be no principled basis
on which to defend a particular version of federalism, they do at least
underscore that federalism can be useful from the popular point of view. To
determine whether this utility generates consistent value, I would judge
whether it serves the ends of government. At the risk of oversimplification,
those would entail solving social problems and enabling the realization of
popular values and preferences.so
78. Government officials and politicians might think similarly, though they also will be
motivated to preserve the institutional location of their power.
79. As I explain in more detail below, recent work on immigration federalism highlights the fact
that restrictionist immigration measures have been adopted primarily in jurisdictions in
which Republicans control the state or locality in question. Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan,
supra note 77, at 2126-29. The networks and norm entrepreneurs that have been shopping
such measures around the country, not surprisingly, have found receptive audiences for
their policy ideas in parts of the country with particular identities, accomplishing piecemeal
through our decentralized system objectives that face greater resistance at the national level,
not to mention in Democratic-leaning states. The challenges of enacting national legislation
are not only structural, because of the numerous veto gates in the legislative process, but
also partisan, because of the presence of a Democratic president and his political appointees
at the helm of the federal immigration enforcement bureaucracy. Recent scholarship adds to
the picture the possibility that restrictionist activity at the state and local level may in fact
stymie reform in Congress. See id. at 2078-82.
so. Noticeably missing from this account of what a system of government should achieve is one
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The first question-does federalism maximize welfare and effectively
enable solutions to those problems the electorate believes need to be
addressed -is of a piece with one of the traditional justifications for federalism,
namely that it creates laboratories of democracy. The value of federalism to this
activist conception of government is not clear." The experimentation defense
has not survived academic scrutiny in robust form,12 though examples of
welfare-enhancing experimentation made possible by federalism certainly
abound, as the drug policy narrative explored in the previous Parts
underscores. Whether federalism serves problem-solving ends by generating
new programs or ideas for reform that could be borrowed by other states or
scaled up to the national level likely will depend in part on the sort of problem
at issue.3 Federalism might have its greatest problem-solving value when the
issue either doesn't rate on the national agenda or the veto gates built into the
national policymaking apparatus mean the only government action possible is
of the key benefits claimed in traditional constitutional theory for federalism-the
preservation of individual liberty. See infra note 99 (identifying this value as articulated by
the Supreme Court in cases such as United States v. Lopez and Alden v. Maine). I am skeptical
that any necessary correlation exists between the creation of a system of dual sovereignty
and the preservation of liberty, primarily because of the powerful entity the federal
government has become. Recent judicial efforts to limit that power to preserve liberty have
seemed puny on the ground, and even the very significant curtailment of the spending
power in NFIB v. Sebelius has only the vaguest of connections to the protection of liberty.
See also Memorandum on Preemption, supra note 40 (recording the President's observation
that states and localities sometimes better protect individual liberties than the federal
government). More to the point, public opinion and democratic accountability seem like far
more meaningful checks on an overweening government. Cf ERIC POSNER & ADRIAN
VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2010).
8,. We might just as easily identify a popular interest served by federalism as the interest in
deregulation. If the existence of a federal system on balance pushes in the direction of de-
regulation by leaving social welfare matters in the hands of states, which will be less able
and willing to regulate than the federal government, and we believe that private ordering
better serves social welfare goals, then federalism serves popular ends, but for reasons
different than the ones I have just described.
82. For the classic challenge to the laboratories assumption, see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk
Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 594 (1980).
For a recent assessment of the arguments in defense of the laboratories justification and an
affirmation of the skepticism voiced by Rose-Ackerman, see Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy,
Laboratories ofDemocracy? Policy Innovation in Decentralized Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333,
1334 (2009) (concluding that "there are no demonstrably overwhelming replies to Rose-
Ackerman's skepticism").
83. For an argument that subsidiarity, or placing control over policy at the lowest level of
government possible, improves the "adaptive efficiency" of federal systems, including by
expanding the pool of views in the policy-making process, see Jenna Bednar, Subsidiarity and
Robustness: Building the Adaptive Efficiency of Federal Systems, in FEDERALISM AND
SUBSIDIARrTY: NOMOS LV, supra note i (manuscript at 1).
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at the state or local level, and popular pressure is strong enough to spur a
response. An anti-preemption norm, at least within federal practice, if not
doctrinally, thus may be appealing from the popular perspective as a means of
ensuring that states and localities are left with the capacity to solve
particularized problems. What is more, because the federal system already has
entrenched certain mechanisms of governance that integrate the state and local
with the federal, effective problem solving will necessarily entail negotiating
the terrain I outlined in Parts I and II.
The clearer value of federalism from the popular point of view stems
precisely from its creation of multiple electorates - a design feature that
channels the complexity of public opinion by creating varied political
communities with institutional features that can serve as vehicles for the
realization of multiple and contradictory preferences.4 These communities
may be overlapping and connected, but they do not blend into an
undifferentiated mass.8 s By expanding the capacity for politics, our federal
system amplifies opportunities for the expression of popular preferences
through law."6 This value of the system will exist even when states and
localities fail to function as the proverbial laboratories of democracy serving
broader systemic interests in creative problem solving.
The marijuana legalization referenda in Colorado and Washington nicely
illustrate how federalism as a system of governance can serve the interests of
discrete groups of voters in this way. State-level decision-making has generated
concrete benefits for citizens of the two states, in an environment in which the
same benefits are unachievable at the national level. Despite the continuing
84. In her essay for this Feature, Heather Gerken emphasizes the value of federalism in "making
space for oppositional politics," which she lauds as a means of building loyalty in the
opposition by giving dissenters the chance to "offer real-life instantiations of their ideas."
Gerken, supra note 68, at 1978. In addition to providing more vehicles for the translation of
popular ideas into law and therefore into power, this feature of federalism can have
integrative functions by satisfying minorities as well as majorities.
8s. Citing polling studies done by James Fishkin, Loren King notes that citizens seek to learn
more in smaller polities. See King, supra note 72 (manuscript at 20-21).
86. This popular benefit of federalism resembles the claim made by scholars that federalism
permits citizens to vote with their feet and thereby engenders competition that will improve
the system or maximize people's capacities to live out their preferences. For a recent example
of this form of argument, see Ilya Somin, Foot Voting, Federalism, and Political Freedom, in
FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARrrY: NOMOS LV, supra note 1 (manuscript at 3, 10-14) (arguing
that foot voting enables political choice and enables individuals to maximize their freedom
by selecting their destiny and that decentralization therefore should be maximized). I am
reluctant to embrace this particular approach, though, because it has always struck me as
highly implausible given the stickiness of family and other commitments, including to jobs,
that trump preference maximization through relocation.
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potential for federal enforcement, the referenda have eliminated state
prohibitions that mirrored federal ones and thus substantially alleviated the
risk of prosecution for marijuana possession, especially given the remote nature
of the federal government and the comparative difficulty of federal
prosecution. In addition to advancing certain individuals' liberties, this
development could have salutary public policy consequences by shifting law
enforcement resources to more serious dangers and chipping away at high
levels of incarceration for non-violent offenses. In other words, sub-federal
decision-making is not merely expressive (in this case of the irrationality and
perverse consequences of the drug war) -it enables political communities to
translate expressive interests into policy benefits not achievable at the federal
level. To be sure, it remains to be seen whether these experiments will give rise
to some of the federal government's fears, such as diversion to juveniles and
neighboring states that would prefer not to have a marijuana market in their
midst. One person's popular benefit is another's externality. But my strong
intuition is that these experiments will promote long-term policy gains beyond
the states where they began, even if in fits and starts.
The value of federalism to the realization of popular preferences stems not
only from its creation of multiple sites for the people to exercise power, but
also from the fact that the system enables polities to structure their governing
processes in different ways that might change the scope and intensity of
democratic decision-making. The referendum process that yielded the
marijuana legalization laws in Colorado and Washington might not have been
immune from the effects of money in politics, but it arguably expanded the
people's capacity for politics by providing them a way around divided,
cautious, or slow-moving legislatures and then forcing those legislatures to act
to implement their will.7 In the case of same-sex marriage, different forms of
direct democracy also have enabled voters to respond to court decisions with
which they disagree, either amending state constitutions to prohibit same-sex
marriage or recalling judges who have struck down such prohibitions.
The horizontal dynamics created by federalism will re-enforce the
expansion of the people's capacity for politics through these alternative forms
of decision-making by allowing voters to derive external support for their
efforts through the networks and fundraising of like-minded people. These
expanded possibilities for deliberation will also help local interests influence
national debates by giving their preferences profile and thus the opportunity to
influence others." As Heather Gerken puts it, the existence of "state and local
87. Cf Bulman-Pozen, Afterlfe, supra note 5, at 1952 (discussing the value of ballot initiatives for
creating "a space for lawmaking outside the usual partisan processes").
88. In some instances, the imperatives of enforcement might trump the desire for widespread
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platforms . . . connect[s] dissenters to the large and powerful networks that
fuel policymaking in the United States."' In other words, lawmaking power at
the state and local level can translate into influence at the national level, thus
giving both minorities and dispersed majorities greater purchase on public
debate and policy.
But the system also will create opportunities for national majorities by
enabling national politics to take shape through sub-federal politics and
decision-making -a lesson apparent in the discussion of horizontal federalism
in Part 11.90 Particularly when channeled through the mechanisms of direct
democracy, local lawmaking can provide a platform for outside groups to
influence policy developments in other states and localities through
contributions to political campaigns and issue drives.9' To be sure, these
horizontal forms of influence and information sharing can occur in unitary
regimes as well. But the existence of sometimes rival but often peer governing
institutions in other jurisdictions to learn from can make any policy gains made
as a result of the sharing deeper and more lasting. As a result, contrary to
assumptions made by some nationalists, the multiplicity fostered by federalism
need not be balkanizing but can instead be productive and integrative,
particularly if we assume the existence of a diverse or polarized polity.
Of course, in a world of expanded politics, voices that might otherwise be
dominant may become muted or ineffective because of the multiplication of
chances for contradiction -a particular dilemma for groups that might seek the
entrenchment of a national governing norm to replace a multiplicity of
regimes. For dispersed national majorities-for example, Democrats in
Republican states when Democrats control Washington, or for the
unorganized elements of the national electorate that nonetheless share
politics, and the perpetuation of political debates can undermine effective governance. With
respect to enforcement capacity, the dynamic does not always flow in the direction of
expansion, at least not for the federal government, because sub-federal agents may have
different ideas concerning implementation methods and enforcement priorities. What is
more, for both the federal and the sub-federal, efforts to cooperate to expand capacity may
result in irresolvable conflict or constraints on one or the other's policy preferences.
Negotiating these tensions is precisely what is at stake in the negotiation of the federal-state
dynamic.
89. Gerken, supra note 68, at 1980.
go. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
gi. See Bulman-Pozen, Afterlife, supra note 5, at 1952 (noting how participation by out-of-state
actors in fundraising and campaigning around initiatives "provides a forum for Americans
nationwide to participate in political contests that may fall outside of national party
politics," even though only state voters ultimately decide the fate of direct democracy
initiatives).
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common views -an active federal government might be preferable. Majorities
that cut across jurisdictions might sometimes seek to foreclose diversity and
impose commonality on popular constituencies in disagreement, sometimes
simply to advance policy preferences but often to protect fundamental rights.
The belief in the need for the federal government to impose a consensus can be
fierce. The highly charged debate over abortion, for example, pits a strong
commitment to the protection of a constitutionally guaranteed baseline right to
terminate a pregnancy-the ultimate expression of a national norm-against
deep ideological and moral disagreement that has resulted in pitched state-level
politics and erosion of the right for the better part of thirty years.
The debate over abortion in fact highlights the most vexing puzzle, in my
mind, that must be addressed in any effort to judge whether and how
federalism serves the popular interest. Even if we can see the clear benefits of
diversity in decision-making, when ought the central government, whether
through the courts or the political branches, attempt to consolidate a principle
or policy and thus shift the balance of the federal system from diversity to
uniformity?92 The trajectory of the marriage equality debate also highlights the
challenge of determining when consolidation serves the public good. In 2003,
when the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts issued its landmark
decision declaring prohibitions on same-sex marriage to be unconstitutional
under the state constitution,93 pursuit of a similar holding at the federal level
seemed dangerous: to advocates of same-sex marriage because the Court could
have entrenched the constitutionality of such prohibitions and generated
political backlash, and to opponents who resisted national resolution of a moral
issue over which broad national consensus had hardly materialized. 94 Over ten
years later, the swift progress through the states of a marriage equality norm
and the dramatic shifts in public opinion seem to have vindicated the value of
federalism to the debate, but they also have brought us closer to the brink of a
national-level reckoning. It seems just a matter of time before the Supreme
Court will have to face the constitutional question on the merits of whether
same-sex marriage can be prohibited. If it finds ways to avoid the issue, as it
92. Another way to frame this central demand of a federal system, familiar to constitutional
theory, is as the need to determine when outliers ought to be forced to cede to a higher-level
consensus-a central question in death penalty jurisprudence, for example.
93. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
94. I argue elsewhere that concerns for backlash are often overstated and that the involvement
of courts in the same-sex marriage debate has encouraged rather than strangled democratic
politics, though early Supreme Court involvement would indeed have stymied what has
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did in Hollingsworth v. Perry,95 or finds prohibitions constitutionally
permissible, then minorities in states that refuse to recognize marriage equality
will be stuck in second-class status. But if it broaches the subject and declares
prohibitions on same-sex marriage invalid, it will have foreclosed ongoing
debate and opportunities for dissenters within the system to govern, in
Heather Gerken's formulation.
To decide which road is in the popular interest, we must be able to answer
the question: at what point do ideological or other forms of diversity
degenerate from being democracy-reinforcing and constructive into producing
rights violations, or balkanizing the polity in a way that undermines the
integrative project of the nation-state, or creating mundane policy chaos? No
doctrinal test will be adequate to answer this question, but it is the key
question for a theory of federalism that characterizes the system as one that
advances the national interest. We can at least begin by trying to spell out the
relative values of conflict and uniformity-an inquiry that does not receive
enough attention in federalism debates. I grapple with this tension elsewhere,
and so I only note here that "it can be difficult even after nationalizing
moments to entrench a clear national norm, because such norms are elusive, or
even ephemeral, and a commitment that at one point might have been a matter
of consensus often gives way to disagreement about its meaning, as public
opinion evolves and political fortunes change."96 In other words, the project of
bringing outliers within a federal system (whether at the national or the state
level) into some sort of uniform line will be politically perilous and hardly
straightforward,97 in large part because consensus often exists only when
principles are stated at a high level of generality. It is in the implementation of
consensus that things begin to fracture into competing visions -precisely when
having institutional means available to channel disagreement will be vital to the
popular interest.98 I thus return to an observation with which I began - that the
95. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
96. See Rodriguez, supra note 6 (manuscript at 47).
g. Indeed, the critique that a conventional or consensus morality does not exist has deep roots
in constitutional theory. John Hart Ely wrote in 1980 that "there is a growing literature that
argues that in fact there is no consensus to be discovered (and to the extent that one may
seem to exist, that is likely to reflect only the domination of some groups by others)." JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 63 (1980). Ely also
emphasized that widespread social traditions can be both good and bad from the point of
view of justice and that the reality is one of competition among traditions and moralities,
not consensus. Id. at 60-62.
gs. Elsewhere I have elaborated this point with respect to the civil rights movement,
highlighting how the debates over disparate impact and affirmative action reflect the elusive
nature of national consensus and how the debate over the validity of the former as a policy
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popular interest depends on having a system of government that makes
ongoing negotiation possible, which requires robust local institutions and
fairly generous tolerance of disharmony.
CONCLUSION
The preceding discussion accepts federalism as a hardwired feature of our
Constitution and our political culture but emphasizes that, within its
structures, a great deal of space remains for arguing about how inter-
governmental relationships ought to be constructed and competing interests
reconciled when they arise. I began with an internal point of view and
considered how the actors within the system understand their relationships to
one another, and the corresponding advantages that might be harnessed from
decentralized decision-making as opposed to consolidation. This sort of
inquiry, which defines the work of federalism as a system, highlights an
important feature of the regime-that its contours are always under
construction, determined in large part by the advantages the different actors
might accrue through their interactions with one another. Though this point of
view may make it difficult to articulate totalizing theories about the system's
value and even its purposes, implicit throughout my discussion is an
appreciation of the value of decentralization to all of the actors in the system,
including the federal government. The discussion also highlights the
importance of facilitating interactions and trade-offs among governments, not
only by resisting overly rigid and hierarchical rules to govern relations, but also
by identifying opportunities for institutional integration that enable either joint
or concurrent decision-making.
The fact that federalism need not take on a fixed form does not mean that
the processes of negotiation should not be informed by certain principles that
transcend institutional interests. Ideally, the actors that shape its parameters
would think of their roles in broader systemic perspective, or through the lens
of how best to advance the popular interest and achieve the purposes of
government.99 I have only begun this sort of external evaluation here. But if we
tool has taken shape in a decentralized fashion arguably productive of a d6tente, aided in
part by the Supreme Court's willingness (for now) to permit decentralized debate. See
Rodriguez, supra note 6 (manuscript at 44-48).
99. When courts in particular articulate the traditional values of federalism, they often begin
from the premise that robust state sovereignty or identity (or limited federal power) ought
to be advanced because of the inherent advantages of a decentralized structure. See, e.g.,
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 575-77 (2000) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748-52 (1999). Protecting states protects liberty by diffusing power;
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assume that the purposes of government are to advance the popular will and
help solve social problems that affect the people's health and wellbeing, I
would defend the proposition that the federal system works well, at least to
promote the former, by expanding the capacity for politics and therefore for
popular expression. The primary systemic benefit of this expansion may
ultimately be that it enables national conversations that embrace contradictions
and that ultimately lead to better national integration over time. A
decentralized system makes it possible for contradictory policies to coexist and
keeps open the capacity for change -an especially important feature in a system
of government in light of the elusive quality of consensus and the diverse
nature of our polity. As I have attempted to show, these features of federalism
are ones also appreciated by its institutional players, and they therefore inform
federalism in practice as well as in theory.
I take one of the central contributions of this whole Feature to be its
challenge to the nationalist's suspicion of the sub-federal through its
demonstration of how decentralization can serve national and integrative ends
by leaving open opportunities for negotiation. My own view is that federalism
has been and will likely continue to be crucial to maintaining a functioning
polity amidst a deeply diverse electorate. Throughout my work I have
expressed strong intuitions that decentralization is well suited to the project of
achieving equilibrium in a diverse setting, not only because it permits a sharp
focus on the institutional locations of integration, but also because of its
expansion of our capacity for politics and therefore for ongoing negotiation
about our differences.
states can serve as laboratories of democracy; and state governments and officials better
channel popular will because they are closer to the people and can better track popular
preferences. To be sure, each of these defenses of federalism serves a larger principle -
protecting individual rights, promoting effective problem-solving, and instantiating the
popular will in the work of government -all of which dovetail with what I have defined as
the ends of government. But we should not assume that any particular federalist
arrangement (or that federalism itself) will always advance these goals. Instead, we should
consider how federalism plays out in practice to determine whether and then how best it can
serve these ends.
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